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terrorist group rocked this Muslim majority country, started from
the Bali Bombing (2002) followed by other consecutive bombings,
such as, J.W. Marriott Hotel bombing (2003), the Australian
Embassy bombing (2004), and Ritz Carlton Hotel bombing (2009).
This article attempts to examine the ways in which the govern-
ment responded towards the problem. What sort of policies did
the Indonesian government take to respond to terrorism during
the 2002—2009 period? What can be learned?
This article shows that the government has effectively used a
combination of policy approaches in dealing with the terrorism. It
has adopted the legal approach or law-enforcement (“hard ap-
proach”) by issuing the anti-terrorism law as a legal framework and
by reorganizing the police force to strengthen its counter-terrorist
capability. At the same time, it also adopted an “ideological”
approach (soft approach) to battle religious extremism. This sort of
approach is mainly aimed at defusing and neutralizing the reli-
gious extremism of terrorist groups and preventing it from spread-
ing into the wider community.
The following section will elaborate both policy approaches
adopted by the government as well as the problems related to the
approaches.
RESEARCH METHODS
This study uses a qualitative research method. Qualitative
research is characterised by its aims, which relate to understanding
some aspect of social life, and its methods which (in general)
generate words, rather than numbers, as data for analysis. The data
used in this research are derived from official documents, direct
interviews with government officials and the secondary sources
(books and journals) on terrorism and counterterrorism.
COUNTER-TERRORISM: THE LAW-ENFORCEMENT
APPROACH
First of all, the government adopted a legal or law-enforcement
approach to physically fight the terrorist network. The main goal
of this approach is to destroy individual terrorist cells, their
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ABSTRACT
Terrorism emerged as serious security problem in
Indonesia since a network of terrorist group rocked
this country, started from the Bali bombing (2002)
followed by other consecutive bombings, such as, J.
W. Marriott Hotel bombing (2003), the Australian
Embassy bombing (2004), and the Ritz Carlton Hotel
bombing (2009). This article attempts to examine
the ways in which the government responded to-
wards the problem. What sort of policies did the
Indonesian government take to respond to terrorism
during the 2002—2009 period? This study uses a
qualitative research method. The data used in this
research are derived from official documents, direct
interviews with government officials and the second-
ary sources (books and journals) on terrorism and
counterterrorism. This article shows that the govern-
ment adopted the legal approach or law-enforce-
ment (“hard approach”) by issuing the anti-terror-
ism law as a legal framework and by reorganizing
the police force to strengthen its counter-terrorist
capability. It also adopted an “ideological” approach
(soft approach) to battle religious extremism. This
sort of approach is mainly aimed at defusing and
neutralizing the religious extremism of terrorist groups
and preventing it from spreading into the wider com-
munity. This article shows that the government has
used effectively both approaches in destroying prob-
lem of terrorism in Indonesia.
Key Words: Indonesia, policy, terrorism,
counterterrorism, legal approach, “ideological”
approach.
INTRODUCTION
Terrorism emerged as serious security
problem in Indonesia since a network of
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leaders, their funding and logistic pipelines as well as
their immediate support network. Different from the
terrorism problem faced by western countries, however,
the Indonesian government faces “indigenous” and
“home-grown” terrorists whose nationality is mostly
Indonesian (Mbai, interview, 2009).
To dent the terrorist network, the Indonesian govern-
ment promulgated anti-terrorism laws as the legal
framework and reorganized law-enforcement agencies
that implement the law. According to Gus Martin, the
organizational profiles of the law enforcement agencies
could vary from country to country, with some countries
having large national police establishments and others
relying more on local police. Law enforcement agencies,
i.e. the police force, take the lead in investigating inci-
dents of domestic terrorism, with other agencies perform-
ing a support role to assist in resolving cases. Martin also
notes that the “law-enforcement” approach has achieved
some success in many countries in disrupting terrorist
networks and it has brought closure to criminal cases
arising out of terrorist attacks (Martin, 2003: 369).
ADOPTING COUNTERTERRORIST LAW
In responding to the Bali bombing on 12 October
2002, the Megawati government issued a number of
crucial policies. The first step is the issuance of anti
terrorist law, i.e. Perpu (the Government Regulation in
Lieu of Law, GRL) No. 1/2002 concerning the Eradica-
tion of Criminal Acts and Perpu No. 2/2002 to make
Perpu No. 1 retroactively applicable to the Bali Bombings.
The GRL is the legal framework to dent the terrorist
network responsible for the Bali Bombing and other
subsequent attacks. Both GRLs were overwhelmingly
passed by the legislature and became Law (Undang-Undang
Anti-Terorisme) in the following year (2003) (Juwana, 2006:
295).
Juwana (2006: 295-6) points out that the Anti-Terror-
ism Law provides four reasons for its promulgation. First,
terrorism had ‘claimed human lives intolerably and
raised widespread fear among the community [and]
caused loss of freedom and damage of property.’ Second,
terrorism had maintained extensive networks, posing a
threat to national and international peace and security.
Third, national legislation was required to implement
international conventions relating to terrorism. Finally,
the anti-terrorism law was a matter of urgency because
existing legislation in Indonesia was inadequate and
failed to deal comprehensively with combating criminal
acts of terrorism (Juwana, 2006: 295-6).
The Anti-Terrorism Law applies to any person,
including a corporation, who commits or intends to
commit a criminal act of terrorism in Indonesia and/or
another nation that has jurisdiction and expresses an
intention to prosecute that person. It also applies to
criminal acts of terrorism which are committed: (a)
against the citizens of Indonesia outside the territory of
Indonesia; (b) against the state facilities of Indonesia
overseas, including the premises of the diplomatic
officials and consuls of the republic of Indonesia; (c)
with violence or threats of violence to force the govern-
ment of Indonesia to take or not to take action; (d) to
force any international organization in Indonesia to take
or not to take action; (e) on board a vessel sailing under
the flag of Indonesia or an aircraft registered under the
laws of Indonesia at the time when the crime is commit-
ted; (f) by any stateless person who resides in Indonesia
(Juwana, 2006: 298).
According to Law No. 15/2003 (Indonesia’s Anti-
Terrorism Laws), basic definition of criminal act of
“terrorism” is, “any person who intentionally uses
violence or the threat of violence to create a widespread
atmosphere of terror or fear in the general population or
to create mass casualties, by forcibly taking the freedom,
life or property of others or causing damage or destruc-
tion to vital strategic installations or the environment or
public facilities or international facilities (Law No. 15/
2003). Those who commit this kind of act of terrorism
can be sentenced to death, or life imprisonment, or a
minimum sentence of four years and a maximum of
twenty years. Those who have the intention to commit an
act of terrorism can be sentenced to a maximum of life
imprisonment (Law No. 15/2003).
Juwana (2006) writes that specific acts of terrorism
defined under the Anti-Terrorism Law include a range of
specific offences relating to various aspects of aviation
security, explosives, firearms and ammunition, and
chemical, biological, radiological and other weapons to
‘create an atmosphere of terror or fear in the general
population, causing danger and destruction to vital
strategic installations or the environment or public
facilities or international facilities. Penalties for these
offences range from life imprisonment or death to
incarceration for a period of between three or four years
and twenty years (Juwana, 2006: 298). The adoption of
Indonesia’s Way To Counter Terrorism 2002—2009: Lesson Learned / ALI MUHAMMAD / http://dx.doi.org/10.18196/jgp.2014.0018
192
Journal of Government and Politics Vol.5 No.2 August 2014
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
the Anti-Terrorism Law is very important as the legal
bases for the government and its security apparatus to
dent terror network in Indonesia.
STRENGTHENING COUNTER-TERRORISM
AGENCIES
To implement the anti terrorist law, the government
also attempts to strengthen the law-enforcement agencies.
The first institution to dent terrorist network is the
Indonesian National Police (POLRI). Law 2/2002 on the
Indonesian Police of January 2002 defines policing as
fostering security and public order, upholding the law,
and protecting, guiding and serving the people. It
specifies that the police are a national force under the
control of the president and spells out powers of arrest,
search and seizure. (ICG Asia Report, 2004: 10).
However, POLRI has weaknesses in the fight against
terrorism: the intelligence analysis, scientific crime
investigation, and post-striking capability. Therefore, the
Indonesian Police Chief (KAPOLRI) reorganized the
police force to overcome those weaknesses (Bachtiar,
interview, 2008). The first step is the establishment of
Satgas Anti-terror dan Bom (Anti-Terror and Bomb Task
Force, ATB) that is directly responsible to the Indonesian
Police Chief. The ATB consists of the best police person-
nel that have links with the foreign police (Pencegahandan
Penanganan Terorisme: 46). KAPOLRI also set up another
police unit to manage counter-terrorism efforts. This
entity became the core of Special Detachment 88 (Densus
88) which formally established in 2004. Densus 88 is the
mechanism by which the POLRI manages counter-
terrorism plans and policy, arranges training, and
handles funding as well as deploying counter-terrorist
teams throughout the country (Wise, 2006:40).
The second institutions are the intelligence agencies.
Indonesia has three major intelligence agencies, the
National Intelligence Agency (BIN, Badan Intelijen
Negara), the TNI’s Strategic Intelligence Agency (Bais),
and National Police intelligence, plus intelligence
elements in the Justice Ministry, Finance Ministry, and
the anti-money laundering agency. However, the problem
is that these agencies operate independently of each
other and do not function as a classical “intelligence
community” (Ibid). There is no joint architecture to
identify, prioritize and allocate collection requirements,
task and manage collection systems and disciplines, or
coordinate the analysis of raw information, nor is there a
formal mechanism for intelligence sharing among the
agencies (Wise, 2006:40). That is the reason why all
those intelligence agencies need to work together and
coordinate their policy.
The third institution is the Armed Forces as a
Supporting Agency. Ministry of Defence officials ac-
knowledge that TNI should play a supporting role in
counter-terrorism, with the lead role being played by the
POLRI. However, senior military officials argue that the
TNI Territorial Command system, which puts a non-
commissioned officer in every village in the archipelago,
provides a national counter-terrorism asset that should be
mobilized to acquire actionable intelligence. The police
are skilled in investigating incidents after they occur, but
only TNI with its vast network of deployed personnel,
can successfully infiltrate terrorist groups, learn their
plans and prevent terror incidents before they happen
(Wise, 2006: 59). In Indonesia’s experience, however, it
is POLRI who plays the leading role in counter-terror-
ism, but reserve a supporting role for the military “in
areas such as the provision of land and maritime assault
teams, maritime security, aerospace security, chemical,
biological and radiological decontamination, intelligence
and logistical support” (Wise, 2006: 59).
Finally, the establishment of the Counter-terrorism
Coordinating Desk (CTCD). The CTCD is important
because the task is to coordinate and enhance integra-
tion in preparing and formulating the Government’s
policy and strategy, including intelligence activities, in
combating terrorism; Second, to coordinate activities in
the area of investigation and prosecution, as well as other
legal steps necessary to fight terrorism; Third, to coordi-
nate international cooperation for institutional and
capacity building through technical, police and intelli-
gence cooperation (Wise, 2006:38). The CTCD has
focused on “harmonization” explaining to police,
prosecutors and judges how the new counter-terrorism
law should be applied (Wise, 2006:46).
According to Wise, those government agencies see
national coordination of counter-terrorism as a zero sum
game. In this view, enhancing the power of the CTCD
can only diminish the clout of the departments and
agencies and perhaps even interfere with their access to
budgetary resources and foreign assistance (Wise, ibid).
That is the important of enhancing the CTCD and give
it more authority so that it can coordinate various anti-
terrorism agencies (Muladi, interview, 2009). The CTCD
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was finally upgraded into a new agency, Badan Nasional
Penanggulangan Terorisme (the National Agency for
Counterterrorism) which has more authority to coordi-
nate policies among counterterrorism agencies.
ANTI-TERRORISM: AN “IDEOLOGICAL” AP-
PROACH
Besides adopting a law-enforcement approach, the
government also complementarily adopted an “ideologi-
cal” approach (“soft approach”) to contain and defuse
extremist ideology (Mbai, Interview, 2009). An “ideologi-
cal” approach, in broad terms, involves the “initiative to
curb, refute or suppress the ideological factors supposed
to be implicated in terrorist acts.”(Hamilton-Hart,
2006:1). The reason behind this approach is that coun-
tering terrorism requires not only the application of law
enforcement measures against individual terrorist cells,
their leaders, their funding and logistic pipelines as well
as their immediate support network (Ramakrishna,
2006:113). However, there is also a pressing need for the
government to neutralize the ‘extremist ideology’ behind
the mind of terrorist groups and to prevent it from
spreading into a wider community.
The Government’s initial intention to include
an ideological approach in the fight against terrorism was
broached in President Megawati’s statement after the Bali
Bombing 2002. In responding to the dreadful events, she
appealed to the mainstream Muslim organizations,
Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama to join in the war on
terror by “promoting the image of Islam as a peace-loving
and cooperative religion.” (The Jakarta Post, 20 November,
2002).
The government commitment to adopt an “ideologi-
cal approach” increased significantly during the
Yudoyono administration, especially, after the Bali
Bombing II (2005). The President said after the bombing,
‘the government needs to give the moderate Muslim
leaders more room to educate… The society should not
be hijacked by small radical groups” (IDSS,2006: 1-2).
The Vice President, Jusuf Kalla, also called on Muslim
leaders to work in concert with the government to
discourage youth from joining terrorist groups. Realizing
the importance of the Muslim community’s support, he
invited Muslim leaders and Ulama to his palace to watch
the video tapes containing terrorists training and the last
messages of the Bali suicide bombers 2005. He tried to
convince the sceptic Muslim leaders of the existence of
religiously-motivated terrorism so that they would support
the government’s policy in the fight against extremism
(Abimanyu, 2008: 23).
The Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal and
Security Affairs, Widodo AS, also asserts that the govern-
ment is committed to fighting terrorism comprehensively
and preventing the growth of radical ideology. He points
out that the central part of counterterrorism policy is to
neutralize radical ideology. He said, “It is not enough to
fight terrorism physically but we have to fight the core of
the problem, in particular the radical ideology”
(www.kapanlagi.com> 30 November, 2005).
NEUTRALISING EXTREMISM: POLICE AND THE
DE-RADICALIZATION PROGRAMME
Since the first Bali bombings in October 2002, more
than four hundred terrorists have been arrested and most
have been brought to trial. Many have been released after
serving their sentences, some sixty in 2006 and 2007
alone, including some senior AJAI leaders. What hap-
pens inside prison, in terms of recruiting ordinary
criminals and prison guards and dissemination of
extremist ideology, thus becomes critical, as does what
happens after their release (Jones, 2008: 75-6).
To neutralize religious extremism among terrorists,
the government (i.e POLRI) conducted what is known as
the “de-radicalization” programme. The programme
generally aims at converting imprisoned terrorists into
moderate Muslims who would also preach moderation to
their colleagues (Effendy, 2008). The fundamental idea
behind this de-radicalization programme is that as well as
detaining, punishing, preventing and deterring terrorists,
the government and community should make a serious
effort to reclaim them and their families for moderate
mainstream society (Sheridan, 2008).
Although de-radicalisation has become popular in
counter-terrorism circles in Indonesia, ICG report shows,
it remains poorly defined in terms of its ultimate aims or
criteria for success (Crisis Group Asia Report, 2007: 11). At
different times, depending on who is speaking, it can
mean a process of counselling aimed at modifying
interpretations of key religious texts; distancing or
disengagement from specific extremist groups; or support
for rehabilitation and reintegration of extremist detainees
into society. It can embrace community outreach
programmes to “inoculate” vulnerable groups against
extremist ideology through travelling “road shows” of
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popular Islamic scholars who reject violence; innovative
use of the Internet and other media to counter extremist
teachings; and youth activity programmes directed at
young men in their late teens and early twenties who
might otherwise be subject to recruitment (Crisis Group
Asia Report, 2007: 12).
According to ICG, de-radicalisation programmes can
be aimed at strengthening “moderate” institutions–an
approach full of pitfalls–or addressing social and eco-
nomic grievances in those areas where marginalization
and discrimination have fostered extremism. Most de-
radicalisation programmes start with prisons and are
mostly conducted by the police (Crisis Group Asia Report,
2007: 12). The main aims is to cure and defuse radical
and extremist thinking among terrorists prisoners so that
they will live in normal life after their released from
prisoners.
Of course, the government need support from the
support of Muslim leaders and scholars (ulama) as well as
the wider Muslim community in the implementation of
this ideological approach. As a Muslim majority country,
the support is very crucial for the success of government
policies.
CONTAINING EXTREMISM: INDONESIAN
ULAMA COUNCIL (MUI)
As an Islamic institution, the MUI represents a wide
range of ulamas from the two biggest Muslim organiza-
tions, i.e. Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah as well as
other small Muslim organizations, i.e. Syarikat Islam, Perti,
Al-Washliyah, Math’laul Anwar, GUPPI, PTDI, DMI and al-
Ittihadiyyah. In the fight against terrorism, MUI has
attempted to counter religious extremism among a small
minority of Muslims and to prevent ‘the radical mindset’
spreading into the wider Muslim community. Their
concern about religious radicalism can be observed from
the statement of the Fatwa commissioner.
To prevent the raising of new a generation of extrem-
ist groups, MUI issued an important fatwa no. 3/2004 on
“terrorism” (Kumpulan Fatwa-Fatwa Aktual, 2006: 164-5).
The fatwa of the MUI clearly stipulated that “terrorism is
a crime against humanity and civilizations and a serious
threat to state sovereignty, to world peace and security,
and to the welfare of the community.” The fatwa also
differentiates the meaning of ‘terrorism’ and ‘jihad.’
According to MUI, terrorism is destructive (ifsad) and
anarchic or chaotic (faudha); the aim is to create and/or
destroy others; it has no clear goals and no limits. In
contrast, ‘jihad’ is an improvement (ishlah), even if using
war, the aim is only to defend Islam or to defend the
oppressed people. Jihad follows the rules stipulated in
Islamic teachings. In jihad, the enemy is clear and it is not
indiscriminate attacks on civilians. Committing terror
acts, whether the action is conducted personally or
collectively, is haram in Islam; but performing jihad is
compulsory (Kumpulan Fatwa-Fatwa Aktual,2006: 165).
The fatwa of MUI clearly stipulates that “suicide
bombing is prohibited in Islam (haram) because it is a
form of hopelessness (al-ya’su) and a form of self-destruc-
tion (ihlak an-nafs), regardless of whether it is committed
in the peace zone (dar al-shulh/ dar al-salam/ dar al-da’wah)
or in the war zone (dar al-harb).” Efforts to seek martyr-
dom (Amaliyah al-Istisyhad) are allowed because it is part of
jihad bin-nafsi which is conducted in the war zone (dar al-
harb) or in a war situation to create fear (irhab) and bigger
damage/loss to the enemy of Islam, including an action
that can kill the actor himself. ‘Amaliyah al-istisyhad is
different from suicide (Kumpulan Fatwa-Fatwa Aktual,
2006: 166-7).
Some are pessimistic and question the effectiveness of
the fatwa. This scepticism emerged since some fatwas
issued by MUI have created public controversies recently,
e.g. the fatwa on religious pluralism and on the
Ahmadiyah sect (ANTARA News, 2007). Azyumardi Azra
notes critically that the fatwa will have no significant
impact on a terrorist group because terrorists have been
brainwashed intensively. They will not follow the fatwa
because they perceive that the ulamas issuing the fatwa are
considered as ulama su’ (bad ulama) (Azra, 2005). Before
his execution, the convicted Bali Bomber denounced the
ulama and said, “The title of ‘terrorist’ is much better
than ulamas that do not care about their Muslim brethren
being butchered by infidels” (Tempointeraktif.com,
2008).
However, the scepticism missed the point since the
main audience of the fatwa is the Indonesian Muslim
community. Firstly, the fatwas of MUI could play a crucial
role in countering radicalism and terrorism since the
Muslim community use them as religious references.
Second, if the fatwas are disseminated widely and well-
socialized into the wider Muslim community, it can
prevent the young Muslims from joining the terrorist
network or prevent them from committing suicide
bombings (Azra, ibid). What plays a role in the effective-
Indonesia’s Way To Counter Terrorism 2002—2009: Lesson Learned / ALI MUHAMMAD / http://dx.doi.org/10.18196/jgp.2014.0018
195
Journal of Government and Politics Vol.5 No.2 August 2014
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
ness of the fatwas is their enormous dissemination
through the printed media, radio, television, and the
Internet (Kaptein, 2004:18). More importantly, since the
fatwa is a rule and norm for the Indonesian Muslim
community in general, it can prevent them from joining
or supporting the fringe, extremist groups.
CONTAINING EXTREMISM: PARTNERSHIP
WITH THE MUSLIM COMMUNITY
Besides the police’s de-radicalization programme
focusing on imprisoned terrorists and MUI’s fatwa
containing extremism in the wider Muslim community,
the government has also forged a strategic partnership
with mainstream Muslim organizations. It is noteworthy
that, although extremist Muslims exist, they represent
only a tiny minority in the world’s biggest Muslim
majority country. The majority of Muslims remain
moderate and function as the main pillar for Indonesian
civil society and bulwark against extremism.
The head of the BNPT, Ansyaad Mbai, points out
clearly that “one of the government approaches in the
fight against extremism is through “strengthening the
partnerships with religious leaders and religious organiza-
tions” (Mbai, 2009: 1). This partnership with the Muslim
community is to emphasize moderate teachings and non-
violent resolutions to religious conflict through massive
religious education campaigns. As has been elaborated,
many Muslim leaders initially denied the existence of the
Muslim radicals who were involved in terrorism. After
the Bali Bombing 2002, the perception changed signifi-
cantly.
The mainstream Muslim communities in Indonesia
are represented organizationally by two moderate Muslim
organizations, Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, who
play major role as the crucial bulwark against extremism.
The two organizations play an important role in counter-
ing radicalism and openly condemning terrorism. Both
have also been promoting interfaith and inter-
civilizational dialogue, the peace movement, and interna-
tional co-operation. Both put forward the idea of Islam as
rahmahlil-alamin (“the mercy for all beings”) reflecting
characteristics, such as inclusive, moderate, tolerant,
straightforward, egalitarian, and prosperous. Their
objectives are nothing less than sustaining or empower-
ing the justice, law enforcement, and people’s prosperity
within the frame of good governance. These characteris-
tics are the result of their understanding of historical as
well as contextual Islamic traditions. Therefore, both
organizations are crucial in countering the infiltration
and the development of radical Muslims in Indonesia
(Muhammad, 2006).
The support of both Muslim organizations in the
government’s fight against extremism is very crucial since
they claim memberships of 57 million and 32
million,respectively. Both organizations can create
awareness through their educational, social and humani-
tarian networks. Possessing around 14,000 schools from
kindergarten to university level, they have also used the
networks to enlighten and spread awareness of the
dangers of terrorism and injustice (Ansar, 2005).
Hasyim Muzadi (of NahdhatulUlama) and Syafii Ma’arif
(of Muhammadiyah) are two Muslim leaders representing
the Muslim voice against extremism. The two leaders
have supported the Indonesian government’s call to fight
against extremism and terrorism by showing their
willingness to mobilize their civic organizations to
correct or enlighten misconceptions about Islam. They
are sure that their organizations could help fight the
scourge by using their vast grassroots-networks to create
awareness that radicalism and terrorism are the enemies
of humanity and civilization. Nahdhatul Ulama and the
Muhammadiyah can take the role to correct or enlighten
this misinterpretation (Ibid). Furthermore, both have
agreed to promote a moderate form of Islam and forge
national unity.
To prevent extremism,Nahdhatul Ulama and
Muhammadiyah, for instance, made crucial joint state-
ments on radicalism and terrorism in the Islamic New
Year of 1427 Hijriyah (Pernyataan bersama PBNU dan PP
Muhammadiyah, 2006). Most notably, both have spoken
out plainly against the more radical versions of political
Islam, in contrast to their previous hesitation. These two
groups, theological and political rivals, have even issued a
joint condemnation of terrorism after both the Bali and
Marriott blasts. This type of commentary from Islam’s
mainstream leaders has emerged since the Bali blast, and
has gone some way to convince a sceptical public that
there is a problem in their midst.
The joint statements stipulated firmly that the Muslim
community must not use violent and terror means to
achieve its goals which are inconsistent with the nature
of Indonesian Muslims. Violence and terrorism have a
damaging impact on Muslims themselves and are worsen-
ing the image of Muslims and Islam. Violence and
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terrorism will only further the forces of “Islamophobia”
in finding a justification to stigmatize Islam as ‘a cruel
religion.’ The joint statements strongly call for the
Muslim community to understand the meaning of ‘jihad’
as efforts to fight the backwardness in education, the
economy, and human resources. ‘Jihad’ should be directed
to fight ignorance, poverty, backwardness, and the moral
degradation among the Muslim community. From the
joint statements it is clear that both Muslim organiza-
tions are strongly against the myopic and violent interpre-
tation of jihad and support ‘peaceful jihad’ to solve the
real problems faced by the Ummah (Pernyataan bersama
PBNU dan PP Muhammadiyah, 2006).
CONCLUSION
This article has demonstrated that the government
take two-pronged policy to counter terrorist threat. Firstly,
the government adopted the legal approach by adopting
anti-terrorism laws as a legal framework to fight terror-
ism. In responding to the Bali bombing on 12 October
2002, it issued anti terrorist law, i.e., Perpu (the Govern-
ment Regulation in Lieu of Law, GRL) No. 1/2002
concerning the Eradication of Criminal Acts and Perpu
No. 2/2002 to make Perpu No. 1 retroactively applicable
to the Bali Bombings. Both GRLs were overwhelmingly
passed by the legislature and became Law in the follow-
ing year (2003).
The government also reorganized the police force by
forming the Anti-Terror and Bomb Task Force and
Densus 88 to strengthen its capacity in denting the
terrorist network. The government also issued a guideline
to counterterrorism policy: Kebijakandan Strategi Nasional
Pemberatasan Terorisme (The National Strategy and Policy to
Eradicate Terrorism) in 2006.
Secondly, the government also adopted an “ideologi-
cal” approach to battle against the “extremist ideology.”
This approach is mainly aimed at refuting and neutraliz-
ing religious extremism of terrorist groups and preventing
it from spreading into the wider community. The police
conducted the de-radicalization programme aiming to
convert imprisoned terrorists into moderate Muslims
who would also preach moderation to their colleagues.
The government also relies on the role of Majelis
Ulama Indonesia (MUI) to speak out in the public by
issuing fatwa haram towards terrorism. Besides that, a
government’s strategic partnership with mainstream
Muslim organizations, such as, Muhammadiyah and
Nahdhatul Ulama, also plays a crucial role in containing
radicalism and extremism in the Muslim community.
Indonesia’s experience shows that the combination of
two-pronged policy approaches are very effective in
countering terrorist threat in Indonesia.*
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